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JURISDICTION 
Petitioner Stephen E. Hausknecht ("Hausknecht") seeks review 
of an Order of the Industrial Commission of Utah granting Kennecott 
Corporation's ("Kennecott") Motion for Review and denying 
Hausknecht's request for a formal evidentiary hearing. (Copies of 
the Order Granting Motion for Review and Order of Clarification are 
attached as Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively). As discussed below, 
this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider 
this appeal because Hausknecht's Petition for Review was untimely 
and improperly filed. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did Hausknecht file a Petition for Review with the Court 
of Appeals on or before December 6, 1993? 
Standard of Review: Not applicable. 
2. Did the Industrial Commission of Utah violate 
Hausknecht's right to due process by reversing its Administrative 
Law Judge's decision to grant Hausknecht#s request for a formal 
evidentiary hearing? 
Standard of Review: Kennecott does not concede that this 
issue has been properly raised, either below or on appeal. 
However, if the issue is properly before the Court of Appeals, the 
Court "shall grant relief only if. on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has 
108331 
been substantially prejudiced" by unconstitutional agency action or 
an unconstitutional statute or rule on which the agency action is 
based. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(a) (1994) (emphasis added). 
This Court has held that whether an administrative agency has 
afforded a petitioner due process is a question of law to which the 
Court will not defer to agency actions. Lopez v. Career Services 
Review Board. 834 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1992). 
3. Did the Industrial Commission of Utah err by finding that 
Hausknecht failed to show that a formal evidentiary hearing is 
necessary pursuant to the requirements of R560-1-4 of the Utah 
Administrative Code? 
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals "shall grant relief 
only if. on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced" 
by the agency's erroneous interpretation or application of the law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1994) (emphasis added). 
In determining whether the agency has erroneously interpreted 
or applied the law, this Court has held that mixed questions of law 
and fact and interpretation of an agency's regulations will be 
reviewed under an intermediate standard whereby the agency decision 
is accorded some deference and will be affirmed if it is 
"reasonable and rational." Vali Convalescent and Care Institute v. 
DOH. 797 P.2d 438, 443 (Utah App. 1990); Hurley v. Board of Review 
of Industrial Commission. 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Kennecott has attached copies of all relevant 
provisions, statutes and rules as Exhibit 3. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. On or about May 12, 1992, Hausknecht filed a charge of 
age discrimination against Kennecott with the Utah Anti-
discrimination Division ("UADD") of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah. (Attached as Exhibit 4.) 
2. On that same day, the UADD sent a Request for Information 
to Kennecott. (Attached as Exhibit 5.) 
3. On June 10, 1992 Kennecott responded to the Request for 
Information and Hausknecht's allegation, attaching a copy of 
Kennecott#s sexual harassment policy and 58 pages of notes relating 
to the termination of Hausknecht's employment. (Attached as 
Exhibit 6.) 
4. On July 22, 1992, Hausknecht responded to Kennecott's 
response but did not submit any affidavits or other documentary 
evidence. (Attached as Exhibit 7.) 
5. On August 20, 1992, Kennecott replied to Hausknecht's 
response. (Attached as Exhibit 8.) 
6. After the UADD investigation of Hausknecht's allegation 
was complete, the UADD director concluded that Hausknecht had 
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"failed to establish a prima facia case of age discrimination" and 
entered a no cause determination and order of dismissal on November 
20, 1992. (Attached as Exhibit 9.) 
7. On December 18, 1992, Hausknecht requested a formal 
evidentiary hearing before the UADD to review de novo the no cause 
determination and order of the director. (Attached as Exhibit 10.) 
8. On April 26, 1993, Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law 
Judge for the Industrial Commission, issued a one page order 
granting Hausknecht#s request for a formal evidentiary hearing. 
(Attached as Exhibit 11.) 
9. On May 12, 1993, Kennecott filed a Motion for Review of 
Judge Allen's Order with the Industrial Commission. (Attached as 
Exhibit 12.) 
10. On October 26, 1993, the Industrial Commission issued an 
"Order Granting Motion for Review" finding that Hausknecht "failed 
to submit any evidence in support of his claim during the UADD's 
informal investigation," The text of that Order, however, 
mistakenly referred to the Motion for Review as being denied rather 
than granted." (Emphasis added.) (Attached as Exhibit 1.) 
11. Consequently, on November 4, 1993, the Industrial 
Commission issued an Order of Clarification wherein it ordered that 
"[Kennecott's] Motion for Review requesting that the evidentiary 
hearing be denied is hereby granted and the decision of the 
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Administrative Law Judge to grant the evidentiary hearing is hereby 
reversed." (Attached as Exhibit 2.) 
12. As of December 6, 1993, Hausknecht had not filed a 
petition for review or paid the statutory and docketing fees 
required by Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. He 
did lodge an "Appellant's Brief." (Attached as Exhibit 13.) 
13. On December 9, 1993, Hausknecht filed with the Court of 
Appeals a "Motion to Rename Document Entitled Appellant's Brief" as 
a Petition for Review. (Attached as Exhibit 14.) 
14. Hausknecht's "Appellant's Brief" did not name the 
Industrial Commission of Utah as a respondent as required by Rule 
14(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. (Attached as 
Exhibit 15.) 
15. Hausknecht did not file a docketing statement within 21 
days of filing his "Appellant's Brief" as required by Rule 9(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. (Attached as Exhibit 16.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure outline the necessary 
procedures for seeking judicial review of administrative orders. 
Hausknecht did not file a petition for review within 30 days of the 
Industrial Commission's final order and failed to comply with the 
other procedures for perfecting an administrative appeal. 
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Accordingly, this Court has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the 
appeal. 
Even if jurisdiction were proper, Hausknecht's argument that 
the Industrial Commission's Order denies him due process fails 
because Hausknecht could have sought de novo review in the district 
court. Even so, due process does not entitle a charging party to 
a formal evidentiary hearing. Hausknecht was given fair notice and 
opportunity to be heard but did not meet his burden to establish a 
prima facia case of age discrimination. 
In addition, Hausknecht's claim that the Industrial 
Commission's Order violates the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 
the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act and the Commission's rules are 
insupportable. The statutory procedure established by those rules 
and regulations specifically contemplates and authorizes the UADD 
Director to dismiss an adjudicative proceeding where the 
investigator uncovers insufficient evidence to support the charging 
party's allegations. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 (4) (a) and (b) 
(1993). A charging party who requests a review of that decision 
must show that a hearing is necessary to add to the evidence in the 
file or cause the evidence to be viewed differently. Utah Code 
Ann. § 34-35-7.1(4) (c) (1993); Utah Admin. Code R560-1-4 (4) (1993). 
Hausknecht failed to make such a showing. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. HAUSKNECHTfS PETITION FOR REVIEW WAS UNTIMELY AND IMPROPERLY 
PILED AND THIS COURT MUST THEREFORE DISMISS THE APPEAL FOR 
LACK OF JURISDICTION. 
A. The Petition for Review Was Not Filed Within 30 Days of 
the Industrial Commission's Final Order. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act provides for judicial 
review of final agency orders. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
14(3) (a) (1993) . The Act requires that a petition for review shall 
be in the form required by the appellate rules and that the 
appellate rules shall govern all additional filings and 
proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(2)(a-b) (1993). Rule 
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure outlines the form 
required for a petition for review and outlines the process for 
initiating an appeal of an administrative order. See Utah R. App. 
P. 14 (1994) . 
Rule 14(a) requires that "a petition for review shall be filed 
with the clerk of the appellate court within the time prescribed by 
statute, or if there is no time prescribed, then within 30 days 
after the date of the written decision or order." Utah R. App. P. 
14(a) (1993)(emphasis added). The statute in this case prescribes 
that: "a party shall file a petition for judicial review of final 
agency action within 30 days from the date that the order 
constituting the final agency action is issued. . . ." Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-14(3) (a) (1993) . Accordingly, Hausknecht had 30 days 
108331 7 
following the Industrial Commission's final order to file his 
petition for review. 
The Industrial Commission reminded Hausknecht of this 30-day 
deadline in its October 26, 1993 Order Granting Motion for Review,1 
and then again, nine days later, in its Order of Clarification 
issued on November 4, 1993.2 In order to have been timely, 
Hausknecht's appeal had to be filed within 30 days of the November 
4, 1993 Order. That 30-day period ended on Saturday, December 4, 
1993. Hausknecht therefore had until the end of the next business 
day, Monday, December 6, 1993, to file a petition for review. See 
Utah R. App. P. 22(a) (1993). Hausknecht did not file a petition 
for review with the clerk on or before December 6, 1993. 
On December 6, 1993 Hausknecht did attempt to initiate his 
appeal by filing an "Appellant's Brief." The clerk lodged3 the 
brief but would not allow it to be filed. (Attached as Exhibit 
13.) It was accepted for filing three days later on December 9, 
1993. (Attached as Exhibit 15.) On December 9, 1993, counsel also 
filed a "Motion to Rename Appellant's Brief" as a petition for 
1
 Order Granting Motion for Review at 3 (attached as Exhibit 
1) . 
2
 Order of Clarification at 1 (attached at Exhibit 2). 
3
 In order to allow a party additional time to correct minor 
errors or omissions, the court clerk will sometimes "lodge" a brief 
to be filed after the time prescribed by the appellate rules. The 
time for filing a petition for review, however, cannot be enlarged 
by the Court. See Utah R. App. P. 22(b)(2) (1994). 
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review,4 clearly in an attempt to avoid the penalty for filing an 
untimely petition for review. (Attached as Exhibit 14,) Of 
course, lodging an appellant's brief is not the same as timely 
filing a petition for review and paying the requisite fees. The 
time for filing a petition for review cannot be enlarged and 
Hausknecht's creative attempt to turn back the clock cannot 
succeed. 
The fact that Hausknecht did not file a petition for review on 
or before December 6, 1993 is dispositive in this case. See 
Maverik Country Stores v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 860 P.2d 
944, 945 (Utah App. 1993) (Court of Appeals must determine 
jurisdiction as a threshold matter). It is well-settled law in 
Utah that " [t]he timely filing of a petition for judicial review of 
an Industrial Commission decision is jurisdictional." Silva v. 
Department of Employment Security, 786 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah App. 
1990) (citing Leonczynski v. Board of Review. 713 P.2d 706 (Utah 
1985). Therefore, if Hausknecht's appeal was untimely, this 
Court's authority extends no further than to dismiss the action. 
Thompson v. Jackson. 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987); see 
4
 Kennecott did not object to Hausknecht's Motion to Rename 
his "Appellant's Brief" because the more relevant issue was whether 
Hausknecht had initiated his appeal by December 6, 1993. Kennecott 
had no notice that an "Appellant's Brief" had been lodged and knew 
only that Hausknecht had failed to file anything with the Court of 
Appeals until December 9, 1993. Because nothing had been timely 
filed, it became irrelevant whether the "Appellant's Brief" was 
allowed to be renamed. 
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also. Prowswood. Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 676 P.2d 952, 
955 (Utah 1984) ("It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that failure 
to timely perfect an appeal is a jurisdictional failure requiring 
dismissal of the appeal.") 
Moreover, because the 30-day statutory deadline creates a 
jurisdictional limitation, even a short delay will not withstand 
dismissal. For example, in Varian-Eimac. Inc. v. Lamoreaux. 767 
P.2d 569, 571 (Utah App. 1989), this Court specifically refused an 
argument which would expand jurisdiction beyond that conferred by 
the legislature in order to create an exception where filings are 
only "one or two days late." Similarly, in Isaacson v. Dorius. 669 
P.2d 849, 850 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court dismissed an 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction that was mailed four days before 
the 30-day deadline but was not received for filing until two days 
after that deadline. 
This Court's jurisdiction over appeals from the Industrial 
Commission is fixed by statute and cannot be ignored. The fact of 
the matter is that Hausknecht did not file a petition for review 
with this Court on or before December 6, 1993. Renaming an 
"Appellant's Brief" that was filed three days late does not change 
that fact. Accordingly, the Court is without subject matter 
jurisdiction and retains only the authority to dismiss the case. 
Any further action in this matter would be improper. See Thompson 
v. Jackson, 793 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987) (where 
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jurisdiction lacking, improper for court to proceed other than by 
dismissal). 
B. The Petition for Review Did Not Otherwise Comply with the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
In addition to requiring that a petition for review be filed 
within 30 days of the agency's final order, the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure contain several other requirements for 
perfecting an administrative appeal. For example, Rule 14(a) of 
the appellate rules requires that the petition shall designate the 
respondent (s) and "[i]n each case the agency shall be named 
respondent.11 Utah R. App. P. 14(a) (1993) (emphasis added). Rule 
14 (b) goes on to require that " [a] t the time of filing any petition 
for review, the party obtaining the review shall pay to the clerk 
of the appellate court such filing fees as are established by law, 
and also the fee for docketing the appeal. The clerk shall not 
accept a petition for review unless the filing and docketing fees 
are paid." Utah R. App. P. 14(b) (1993) (emphasis added). 
Hausknecht's "Appellant's Brief," which was filed as a petition for 
review, did not name the Industrial Commission of Utah as 
respondent5 nor did Hausknecht pay the required statutory and 
docketing fees at the time of filing.6 
5
 See "Appellant's Brief" (attached as Exhibit 15). 
6
 See Notice dated January 13, 1994 (attached as Exhibit 
17) . 
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Beyond that, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure further 
require that " [w] ithin 21 days after a . . . petition for review is 
filed, the . . . petitioner shall file a docketing statement with 
the clerk of the appellate court." Utah R. App. P. 9(a) 
(1993)(emphasis added). Hausknecht did not file a docketing 
statement in this case until February 17, 1993, nearly two months 
late. See Docketing Statement (attached as Exhibit 16.) 
As demonstrated above, Hausknecht did not meet Utah's 
mandatory procedural requirements for appealing an order of the 
Industrial Commission. Accordingly, Hausknechtfs appeal is 
improper and this Court is without jurisdiction.7 
II. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ORDER VIOLATES NEITHER DUE PROCESS 
NOR THE GOVERNING STATUTORY SCHEME. 
Hausknecht claims that Utah's statutory laws governing 
discrimination claims were violated by the Industrial Commission's 
Order denying him an evidentiary hearing. In turn, he argues that 
"the Commission's refusal to allow [him] any type of hearing to 
which he was entitled violates [his] fundamental due process right 
to receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal." Petitioner's 
7
 Hausknecht's apparent failure to read and apply the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure defeats the purpose of those rules, 
which is to identify issues for judicial review in a timely and 
orderly fashion. As a policy matter, it therefore would be 
inconsistent to allow Hausknecht's appeal to proceed given that the 
appellate rules have been wholly ignored or disregarded. 
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Brief at 8. Specifically, Hausknecht charges that the denial of a 
formal adjudicative hearing before the agency violates the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act, the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act, 
and the Industrial Commission's own Administrative Rules. 
Petitioner's Brief at 10. Utah's statutory scheme has been 
complied with, and that compliance has ensured the basic fairness 
to which Hausknecht is entitled. Neither Utah's governing 
statutory scheme nor due process mandates that Hausknecht be 
afforded a formal evidentiary hearing. 
A. Hausknecht Did Not Timely Raise the Issue That Failure to 
Allow an Evidentiary Hearing would Violate His Due 
Process Rights and That Issue Should Not Be Considered. 
At no time prior to filing his Petitioner's Brief did 
Hausknecht raise the issue that failure to grant an evidentiary 
hearing would violate his due process right. That issue was not 
raised in his Notice of Evidentiary Hearing (attached as Exhibit 
17) nor was it raised in response to Kennecott's Motion for Review, 
which sought to overturn the ALJ's order granting an evidentiary 
hearing. As a result, the Court should not now consider the issue 
on review. In State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993), 
this Court held that appellate courts will not consider an issue 
"including a constitutional argument" for the first time on appeal 
absent plain error or exceptional circumstances. This rule applies 
with greater force to non-criminal actions such as this. See LMU 
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Leasing. Inc. v. Conlin. 805 P.2d 189, 197 (Utah App. 1991); Salt 
Lake County v. Carlston. 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1989). 
B. Hausknecht#s Due Process Rights Were Not Violated. 
Hausknecht argues that his due process rights were violated 
because the Industrial Commission denied him a full evidentiary 
hearing. That argument fails for two reasons. First, Utah's 
statutory scheme contemplates that Hausknecht could seek an 
evidentiary hearing before the district court. Second, due process 
only requires that the process be fair and involve a procedure 
appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved. 
Hausknecht fs contention that he was denied due process because 
the Commission denied him access to an evidentiary hearing is 
incorrect. Although not entitled as a matter of right to a formal 
adjudicatory hearing before the UADD, Hausknecht could have 
requested a trial de novo in the district court. The director's 
determination and order of dismissal was made as part of an 
informal process, which when it becomes a final order of the 
Commission, would be reviewable by trial de novo in the district 
court. See Utah Administrative Code R560-1-3(F) (1994); Utah 
Admin. Code R560-1-4 (A) (2) (1994); Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 (1) (e) 
(1994). Therefore, Hausknecht could have made a timely request to 
the district court for review of the director's determination by 
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trial de novo. Instead, Hausknecht sought formal review by the 
Industrial Commission. 
Furthermore, as stated in Nelson v. Jacobson. 669 P.2d 1207, 
1213 (Utah 1983) (citing Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 
341 (Utah 1980)) , " [t]he demands of due process rest on the concept 
of basic fairness of procedure and require a procedure appropriate 
to the case and just to the parties involved." The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that a formal evidentiary hearing is not required to 
satisfy the concept of basic fairness of procedure. In Jones v. 
Ogden Auto Body. 646 P.2d 703 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court 
specifically held that the Industrial Commission had not violated 
the charging party's right to due process by adopting the findings 
of its administrative law judge without holding an evidentiary 
hearing and without entering findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. Id. at 705. The Supreme Court observed that the Industrial 
Commission "shall review the entire record made in said case, and, 
in its discretion may hold further hearings and make findings of 
fact and enter its award thereon." Id. (quoting U.S. Steel Corp. 
v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d 807 (Utah 1980) (emphasis in 
original). In this case, the Commission reviewed the record and 
found that Hausknecht' s burden had not been met and that an 
evidentiary hearing was therefore unnecessary. 
Hausknecht fails to recognize Jones or to cite any contrary 
cases or statutes to support his position that due process, at a 
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minimum, mandates a formal hearing. Rather, Hausknecht cites 
distinguishable cases in which procedural due process was violated 
during administrative hearings. For example, in Anderson v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah. 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985), the 
administrative law judge who presided over that hearing was 
formerly an attorney for one of the plaintiffs. In Bunnell v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah. 740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987), due 
process was denied by the wrongful exclusion of testimony at the 
hearing. Similarly, in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney. 818 
P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991), the plaintiff was denied due process 
because hearsay evidence was admitted at the hearing. 
Even absent the right to a trial de novo, Hausknecht was 
afforded a process which was fair and involved a procedure 
appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved. 
Hausknecht had full and fair opportunity to participate in the 
investigatory process that he initiated and to submit evidence for 
consideration. The fact that he did not produce evidence to meet 
his burden of proving a prima facie case does not reduce the 
process to one of unfairness. As found by the Commission, 
Hausknecht "failed to submit any evidence in support of his claim 
during the UADD's informal investigation. He did not complete and 
sign an affidavit upon filing his charge and submitted no 
documentation or evidence in support of his claim. Every document 
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submitted by the Charging Party was argument not evidence." Order 
Granting Motion for Review at 2 (attached as Exhibit 1). 
Nonetheless, the investigator in this case attempted to 
collect evidence, including a lengthy statement by Kennecott and 
Kennecott's ten page response to a detailed set of investigative 
questions and requests for documentation. Attached as documents 
responsive to those requests were 58 pages of detailed notes 
relating to and taken contemporaneously with Kennecott's 
investigation of Hausknecht's conduct, as well as a copy of 
Kennecott's sexual harassment policy.8 Although Hausknecht replied 
to this evidence submitted by Kennecott, he again failed to provide 
the investigator with any specific evidence or affidavits, or even 
to identify potential witnesses or supporting evidence. Instead, 
he responded solely by way of argument. See Order Granting Motion 
for Review at 3 (attached as Exhibit 1). 
Due process does not excuse a charging party's burden to 
establish a prima facia case of discrimination. In the litigation 
process, parties are often necessarily required to meet their 
initial burden without the prior benefit of a formal evidentiary 
8
 The evidence collected showed that: (1) Hausknecht's age 
had nothing to do with Kennecott's decision to terminate his 
employment; (2) Kennecott terminated Hausknecht's employment 
because he engaged in conduct described as pervasive sexual 
harassment and because his performance was unsatisfactory; and 
(3) Hausknecht was not subject to disparate treatment. See UADD 
Determination dated November 20, 1992 (attached as Exhibit 9). 
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hearing (see, e.g. . motions for summary judgment) . If it were 
otherwise, anyone could obtain such a hearing for any reason or for 
no reason. Even the most expansive interpretation of due process 
cannot condone such waste of administrative time and resources. 
C. The Procedures Followed in This Case Met the Requisite 
Statutory Requirements. 
Hausknecht's claim that Utah's governing statutory scheme was 
violated in this case is unsupportable. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-
7.1(1) (a)
 # provides that a person claiming employment discrimina-
tion may file a request for agency action with the Industrial 
Commission of Utah. Hausknecht filed a claim of age discrimination 
against Kennecott on or about May 12, 1992. (Attached as Exhibit 
4). 
The Act requires that before any hearing is set, the 
Industrial Commission shall assign an investigator to make a 
prompt, impartial investigation of all allegations. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34-35-7.1 (3).9 In this case, the Commission assigned Randall 
Phillips to investigate Hausknecht's allegations of age 
discrimination. 
If the investigator uncovers insufficient evidence to support 
the allegations of discrimination, the Act requires that he or she 
9
 Utah Admin. Code R560-1-3(F) classifies the procedures 
specified in Utah Code aim. § 34-35-7.1, subparts (1)-(5) as "an 
informal process with no hearing and [which] are governed by 
section 63-46b-5, U.C.A.", which sets forth the procedures for 
informal adjudicatory proceedings. 
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report these findings to the director* Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-
7.1(4) (a). After conducting his investigation in this case, Mr. 
Phillips reported that "the facts in the record, viewed in their 
entirety, indicate that there is NO REASONABLE CAUSE to believe 
that Charging Party [Hausknecht] was subjected to discriminatory 
practices as alleged." UADD Determination dated 11/20/92 (Emphasis 
in original)(attached as Exhibit 9). 
The Act goes on to provide that " [u] pon receipt of the 
investigator's report, the director may issue a determination and 
order for dismissal of the adjudicative proceedings." Utah Code 
Ann. § 34-35-7.1(4) (b) .10 In compliance with that provision, 
Director Jay Fowler issued an Order dismissing Hausknecht's 
charges. UADD Order dated 11/20/92 (attached as Exhibit 9). 
Finally, the Anti-Discriminatory Act allows either party to 
challenge a determination and order of the director by making a 
written request to the director for a formal evidentiary hearing 
"to review de novo the director's determination and order within 30 
days of the date of the determination and order for dismissal." 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 (4) (c) . Alternatively, the Anti-
Discriminatory Act provides for informal review which culminates in 
10
 Utah Administrative Code R560-1-4, which "pertains to the 
procedures specified in section 34-35-7.1 UCA" gives the Director 
the option to request the Commission's legal staff to review an 
investigatory file and make a recommendation, or the Director may 
request the investigator to conduct a further investigation. 
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a de novo trial before the district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-15 (district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de 
novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative 
proceedings). 
On December 18, 1992, Hausknecht requested a formal 
evidentiary hearing to review de novo Director Fowler's dismissal. 
Notice of Evidentiary Hearing dated 12/18/92 (attached as Exhibit 
17) . A formal adjudicatory hearing before the agency, however, is 
not a matter of right and must be shown to be necessary. Utah 
Admin. Code. R560 1-4(4) (1993). Furthermore, "a hearing will not 
be considered necessary if the hearing will not add to the evidence 
in the investigatory file or cause the evidence in the 
investigatory file to be viewed differently.11 Id.11 It is the 
Industrial Commission's finding under that rule to which Hausknecht 
objects. The Anti-Discriminatory Act, however, has been complied 
with. 
Hausknecht's argument that the applicable statutory scheme has 
been violated also ignores the fact that the Utah Anti-
Discriminatory Act specifically authorizes dismissal of the 
adjudicative proceeding where there is insufficient evidence of 
11
 The Administrative Code further requires that a formal 
hearing must be necessary to finally resolve the matter and that it 
be appropriate to convert the matter to a formal adjudicative 
proceeding under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3). Utah Admin. Code 
R560-1-5 (1994) . 
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discrimination following an informal investigation. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34-35-7.1(4) (b) (1993). The Utah Administrative Code further 
explains that where a determination and order of dismissal is 
entered by the director, a formal adjudicative hearing will not be 
held by the Commission unless the request for an evidentiary 
hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order 
was timely and shows that such hearing is necessary. See Utah 
Admin. Code R560-1-5 (1993). Hausknecht therefore cannot excuse 
his burden to show that a hearing is necessary by arguing that the 
Industrial Commission's Order violates the statutory law. As set 
forth in part III below, Hausknecht did not make the necessary 
showing to allow the Commission to grant an evidentiary hearing. 
In short, Hausknecht's claims that the Utah anti-discrimina-
tion statutes and his right to due process were violated must fail 
because (1) the Industrial Commission complied with the applicable 
statutory schemes, (2) a formal evidentiary hearing is not required 
to satisfy due process where an opportunity to be heard has been 
afforded within the relevant statutory scheme, and (3) the 
procedures embodied in the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act as well as 
the Administrative Procedures Act gave Hausknecht the opportunity 
to prove his prima facie case. 
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III. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORRECTLY FOUND THAT HAUSKNECHT DID 
NOT SHOW AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO BE NECESSARY UNDER R560-
1-4. 
The ultimate issue for resolution on appeal is whether 
Hausknecht was properly denied a formal hearing for failure to show 
that such a hearing is necessary under Utah Administrative Code 
R560-1-4. Hausknecht argues the Industrial Commission of Utah 
erred in finding and concluding that "Charging Party has failed to 
show that an evidentiary hearing is necessary pursuant to the 
requirements of R560-1-4." Order Granting Motion for Review at 3 
(attached as Exhibit 1). Rule 560-1-4 of the Utah Administrative 
Code provides: 
A request for an evidentiary hearing must state a reason 
why the hearing is necessary. A hearing will not be 
considered necessary if the hearing will not add to the 
evidence in the investigatory file or cause the evidence 
in the investigatory file to be viewed differently. In 
most cases, the need to cross-examine the individuals who 
have submitted affidavits supportive of the initial 
finding or determination of the Commission will be 
considered a valid reason for granting a request for a 
hearing by the Commission. 
Utah Admin. Code R560-l-4(4) (1993) . 
Hausknecht's burden before the Commission was therefore to 
show that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to "add to the 
evidence in the investigatory file or cause the evidence in the 
investigatory file to be viewed differently." Utah Admin. Code 
R560-1-4(A) (4) (1993). He did not meet that burden. The 
Commission correctly applied the law to the factual record and 
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reasonably and rationally concluded that Hausknecht was not 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Utah Administrative Code 
R560-1-4. See Johnson v. Department of Employment Security, 782 
P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1989) (Court of Appeals will not disturb 
application of law by the Industrial Commission to its factual 
findings unless the determination exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality). Accordingly, this Court must 
affirm the Industrial Commission's Order. 
Hausknecht, argues in his brief that the Commission erred and 
that a formal hearing was shown to be necessary because: (1) There 
was an insufficient collection of evidence; (2) cross examination 
of witnesses is mandated; and (3) a hearing is necessary to compel 
testimony which "might" substantiate his allegation of age 
discrimination. Petitioner's Brief at 10-12. Neither these 
arguments, nor the record below, provide any basis for concluding 
that the Commission's order exceeds the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality. 
Hausknecht first argues that a hearing is necessary because 
"other than certain cursory and conclusory statements submitted on 
behalf of the petitioner and respondent, there has been no 
admissible evidence (other than petitioner's initial statement) 
submitted to the investigator." Petitioner's Brief at 11. 
Hausknecht mischaracterizes the record. As discussed above, 
although Hausknecht did not avail himself of the opportunity to 
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submit or identify evidence, Kennecott cooperated fully with the 
UADD's investigation and submitted considerable evidence, which 
included a detailed response to the allegations of the charge as 
well as a detailed response12 to the numerous requests for 
information by the investigator. That information included 
Kennecott's own investigation notes and sexual harassment policy. 
Hausknecht responded to Kennecott's information solely by argument. 
See Order Granting Motion for Review at 2 (attached as Exhibit 1) ; 
see also letter from Erik Strindberg to Jay Fowler dated July 22, 
1992 (attached as Exhibit 7) . Based on this record, Hausknecht was 
unable to convince the Industrial Commission that a formal 
evidentiary hearing was necessary to review the director's 
determination and order of dismissal. Hausknecht is also unable to 
show that the Commission's decision was unreasonable or irrational. 
Moreover, the express purpose of a formal evidentiary hearing 
is "to review de novo the director's determination and order." 
Utah Admin. Code R560-1-4(A)(3) (1993). It is not to reopen the 
investigative process or raise new issues. As the Industrial 
Commission observed in this case, "a party should not be allowed to 
obtain an evidentiary hearing by claiming that the UADD has failed 
to properly investigate the subject charge when the party 
requesting the hearing has failed to participate fully in the 
12
 See letter to Jay H. Fowler from James M. Elegante dated 
June 10, 1992 (attached as Exhibit 6). 
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proceeding below." Order Granting Motion for Review at 3 (attached 
as Exhibit 1) . 
Second, Hausknecht argues that a hearing is necessary to 
cross-examine witnesses, citing a criminal case as support. 
Petitioner's Brief at 11. Here, however, Hausknecht is not a 
criminal defendant but is the charging party in an administrative 
matter whose initial burden it is to establish a prima facie case. 
See Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine. 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) 
(In employment discrimination case it is plaintiff's burden to show 
similarly situated employees were not treated equally and that the 
defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiff. The 
burden then shifts to defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the action.). The Commission found that 
Hausknecht did not submit evidence to meet his burden. 
Determination at 5 (attached as Exhibit 9) . Indeed, the fact that 
Hausknecht did not meet his burden to show a prima facia case of 
age discrimination meant that Kennecott was relieved of any burden 
to defend against Hausknecht's allegation with affidavits or any 
other evidence. The Commission made it very clear that it did not 
need to reach the issue of whether Kennecott had a "legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for its conduct" as that burden "is relieved 
by Charging Party's [Hausknecht] failure to establish a prima facie 
case of age discrimination..." Determination at 5 (attached as 
Exhibit 9) . Accordingly, the UADD did not rely on the evidence 
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submitted by Kennecott in dismissing Hausknecht's allegation and 
the cross-examination contemplated by R560-l-4(4) was found to be 
unnecessary. Order Granting Motion for Review at 3 (attached as 
Exhibit 1) . Based on the record below, that finding does not 
exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. 
Third, Hausknecht argues that a hearing is necessary so he can 
obtain the testimony of Kennecott employees who would be reluctant 
to testify unless subpoenaed. Petitioner's Brief at 11-12. This 
issue was not raised below and thus cannot be the basis for revers-
ing the Commission's order under the applicable standard of review. 
Furthermore, Hausknecht has yet to identify any specific witnesses, 
let alone the substance of any expected testimony, which might be 
favorable to his position. See Notice of Evidentiary Hearing 
(attached as Exhibit 10). Instead, he states only that "[a] 
hearing would provide petitioner the opportunity to subpoena 
Kennecott employees who may have testimony favorable to his 
position." Petitioner's Brief at 11 (emphasis added). Hausknecht 
attempts to buttress this argument by arguing that the investiga-
tion never sought any testimony from Kennecott's employees--
ignoring the fact that significant information from Kennecott's 
employees was submitted to the investigator in response to 
Hausknecht's allegation and the investigatory request for 
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information.13 Even so, the purpose of the evidentiary hearing is 
not to conduct a fishing expedition, nor is it to identify and 
collect evidence, but rather, to review for correctness the UADD 
director's dismissal. Recognizing this, the Industrial Commis-
sion's conclusion that an evidentiary hearing was not shown to be 
necessary is both reasonable and rational. 
Hausknecht was unable to show the Industrial Commission that 
a hearing would add to the evidence in the investigatory file or 
cause that evidence to be viewed differently because, quite simply, 
there was no evidence of age discrimination in the file. 
Therefore, while Hausknecht argues that a hearing may be helpful to 
his case, and criticizes the investigation for not substantiating 
his unsupported claim, he offers nothing to show that the hearing 
is necessary or that the Industrial Commission erred. Accordingly, 
the Industrial Commission's Order must be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should dismiss this case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Even if jurisdiction were proper, Kennecott asserts 
that for the reasons set forth above, the Order of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah denying Hausknecht's request for a formal 
13
 This evidence, however, did not provide support for 
Hausknecht's prima facie case but rather went to the issue of 
Kennecott's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. 
108331 27 
evidentiary hearing did not violate Utah statutory law nor 
Hausknecht's right to due process. Hausknecht simply failed to 
establish a prima facia case of age discrimination and further 
failed to show that an evidentiary hearing is necessary. 
Accordingly, Kennecott respectfully requests that the Court 
dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction or that it affirm the 
dismissal ordered by the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
DATED this //'day of May, 1994. 
BARBARA K. POLICH 
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Attorneys for appellee, 
Kennecott Corporation 
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